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Abstract: From a radical behaviorist perspective, prescriptive ethics deals with two main axes or dimensions: (1) the 
effects of what we do over ourselves and over other people; and (2) the effects of what we do considered along the 
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We interact with the world and produce conse-
quences – we, the living beings, from amoebas to humans. 
Operating in the world and transforming it, as pointed out 
by Skinner (1981/2007), characterizes living beings.
The feeding habits of amoebas involve well-known 
and relatively simple behavioral processes. It “hunts” algae 
or plankton in the water. When it detects the presence of 
plankton, for example, an amoeba moves towards these or-
ganisms, extends parts of its body as if they were arms (that 
is why they are called pseudopodia), captures and ingests 
the plankton. Once its digestion is completed, the substanc-
es with no nutritional value are returned to the environment. 
The simple nutritional behavior of amoebas imme-
diately operates in the environment and transforms it. An 
amoeba, by feeding, improves its chances of survival and 
leaves a different world for itself and for all other living 
beings: a world with less plankton (and with a little amount 
of waste materials).
Besides this immediate effect, there is a legacy from 
an amoeba’s behavior that extends through time. Its behav-
ior of ingesting plankton is a small part of the evolution of 
species by means of natural selection. The physiological 
and behavioral characteristics of amoebas that help it cap-
ture and digest nutritious substances are presumably more 
likely to stay in its phylogenetic makings. (likewise, the 
characteristics of plankton that protect them from amoeba’s 
attacks tend to be favored).
We see therefore that, even in the first and most 
basic level of selection by consequences, it is possible to 
identify two important characteristics in the behavior of 
organisms: (1) it affects other organisms besides the one 
presenting these behaviors; (2) it has its effects extended 
throughout time. To live is to operate: it is to produce con-
sequences not only for oneself, but also for other living 
beings; immediate consequences, but also consequences 
that extend themselves throughout time.
Descriptive ethics
How is ethics concerned with this? 
There is a part of ethics, which is normally called 
descriptive ethics, whose objective is solely to explain the 
behavior of organisms – especially, of course, human be-
ings. We might say, as the philosophers do as a general 
rule, that the goal of descriptive ethics is to specifically 
explain ethical behavior, but that would mean we would 
have the hard task of distinguishing between ethical and 
non-ethical behavior (which would not mean to distinguish 
between good and bad behavior, but rather behavior that 
is controlled by both ethical and non-ethical variables). It 
would be possible to use several criteria in this distinc-
tion. This task, however, besides being expensive, may be 
of little use, or even counterproductive. From a radical be-
haviorist perspective, descriptive ethics is the field of the 
selection of behaviors by its consequences – and Skinner’s 
explanation (1971b) for ethical behavior includes three 
selection levels: phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and cultural. 
Everything we do, everything we like and wish for us and 
others is only understandable when these three selective 
stories are combined. Treating ethics as a special quality 
of our behavior (or as a characteristic that is only reserved 
to part of our behavioral repertoire) may take our attention 
from what really matters in descriptive ethics: to explain 
our behavior via selection by consequences, in three con-
jugated levels.
The long history amoebas and plankton are part of 
– the history of the evolution of species by means of natu-
ral selection – is indispensable for understanding why us, 
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human beings, do what we do, feel what we feel, choose 
what we choose. Stating this does not mean to subscribe to 
any biological reductionism. Natural selection is only the 
first out the three selective stories that interest us, and each 
selective story creates the conditions for the next to arise: 
phylogenesis creates the conditions for ontogenesis, and this 
for cultural selection (Skinner, 1981/2007). Understanding 
the interactions among the variables relevant to each of 
these levels is a considerably more complex task than ex-
plaining the behavior of amoebas – which, it is worth men-
tioning, makes the task of descriptive ethics equally more 
complex, especially in regards to human beings.
The evolution of a special kind of operating behav-
ior – verbal behavior – adds variables that are especially 
relevant for explaining ethical behavior. Firstly, because 
descriptive ethics also needs to explain the occurrence of 
certain verbal behavior instances we usually call ethic. 
Whether it is possible and useful to precisely distinguish 
ethical from non-ethical verbal operants, descriptive ethics 
is also interested in knowing, for example, why people give 
verbal responses such as “good” and “bad”. As there are 
no contingencies or special rules that establish when we 
should emit such responses, we may learn to emit them un-
der the control of virtually any circumstance. Qualifying 
an object as good or bad comprises subtleties that require 
careful functional analyses of individual cases, always 
based on the model of selection by consequences. 
Among many other functions, words such as “good” 
and “bad” may serve for a person or group of people to in-
duce other people or groups of people to act certain ways 
– which leads us to the second part of ethics, which com-
prises descriptive ethics.
Prescriptive ethics
Supposedly, there are limits for what science can do 
in the field of ethics. Science can tell us which behaviors or 
behavioral trends were selected at the three selective levels, 
and how they were selected. In the realm of verbal behav-
ior, for example, science may tell us what people call “good 
or “bad”, and why. Besides this, science may help us fore-
see which behaviors will probably be selected in certain 
contexts. Science can also increase (or decrease) the likeli-
hood of several classes of behaviors, in case it considers 
this is good. But how to tell whether something is “good”? 
Scientific knowledge helps our decisions considerably, but 
it alone cannot produce (nor will it supposedly one day pro-
duce) answers to this important question we insistently ask: 
“And now, what shall we do?” Or also: “What is the good 
path, the best course of action?”1
Questions like these were asked by many people 
before philosophy arose, and they are still being asked by 
1 However, it needs to be noted that Skinner suggests, at some times, that 
science could provide us even with these answers. We discuss the subject 
in Dittrich (2004, chapter 3). Harris (2011) is an example of a contem-
porary intellectual that states that science can substantiate prescriptive 
ethics.
many people with no philosophical background. It would 
be absurd to only assign philosophers (or people with a 
philosophical background) to answer these questions. 
However, prescriptive ethics is nowadays identified as the 
philosophical field in which this question is focused on as a 
privileged object of reflection. 
Descriptive ethics is generally identified as the 
field of facts, or of what is (for example, we know that a 
certain person drinks alcohol and says alcoholic beverages 
are good) and prescriptive ethics is generally identified as 
the field of values, or of what it should (or should not) be 
(for example, someone states that a certain person should 
(or should not) drink alcohol. Skinner (1971b) and several 
other authors (Garrett, 1979; Graham, 1977, 1983; Hocutt, 
1977; Rottschaefer, 1980; Vargas, 1982; Waller, 1982) dis-
cussed this distinction and its implications, but we do not 
aim to focus on these discussions here. For now, it suffices 
to recognize that the basic question of prescriptive ethics – 
“What should we do?” – is obviously important, and that 
we do not have ready answers for it.
Philosophy has operated, since the classic Greek 
philosophers, through binary distinctions that define its 
basic fields of interest: “true” or “false” (epistemology, 
logic), “beautiful” or “ugly” (aesthetics), and, finally “good 
or “bad” (ethics). Behavior analysis identifies in all these 
cases (and in any other cases that are submitted to analy-
sis) the presence of positive and negative reinforcers. As a 
general rule, the objects and events we call true, good, and 
beautiful are those that reinforce their production, and the 
objects and events that we call false, ugly, or bad are those 
we escape from or avoid. The possible exceptions (and they 
certainly exist) deserve additional analyses, especially 
considering the complex variables that operate on verbal 
behavior. However, what is important to point out here is 
that epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics deal with behavior 
and with the variables that selectively operate on behavior.
This does not imply reducing, despising, or be-
littling the wealth of human experience. As Skinner 
(1986/1987a) insisted in pointing out, we may go through 
several experiences in our contact with the variety in the 
world – calling objects and events beautiful, pleasant, tran-
scendent, etc. – but this contact also has a relevant effect on 
the form and frequency of response classes that our reper-
toires comprise.
Not only do we call objects or events “good” or 
“bad”, but we also use these very words as reinforcing or 
punishing stimuli (Skinner, 1953/1965, p. 324). Both phi-
losophers and lay people usually call such behaviors “as-
signing values” – which only means, even etymologically, 
to say something is either good or bad. Such naming can 
have several functions. One of them is to generate favor-
able or unfavorable dispositions in other people regarding 
the related objects or events – in other words, to change the 
likelihood of certain classes of responses in the relation-
ships people establish with these objects or events. 
Such behavioral processes are relevant, in the first 
place, to descriptive ethics. Not only we may ask why a 
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person calls any object or event “good” or “bad”, but also 
– for example – why this person tries to create favorable 
dispositions in regards to such objects or events. Questions 
like these may, in principle, have satisfactory descriptive 
answers through the application of the model of selection 
by consequences to specific examples. (this same model 
prevents generic answers that can be applied to all cases 
and all people). Let’s get back to the example of the per-
son who frequently drinks alcohol. This person may also 
say that alcoholic beverages are “good”, or induce other 
people to drink them (they can also say they are “bad” and 
induce other people not to drink them). Supposedly, it is 
possible to understand why this person does it by conju-
gating phylogenetic variables (organic characteristics may 
cause alcohol to produce effects in this person that it would 
not produce in other people), ontogenetic variables (for ex-
ample, drinking alcohol in pleasant occasions, social rein-
forcement of drinking), and cultural variables (for example, 
high availability and easy access to alcoholic beverages, 
valuing alcohol-drinking as a proof of virility in certain 
cultures, etc.).
But we may also take a step behind and notice that 
situations like these allow for another type of question: 
what should we consider good? Let’s see other examples: 
(1) a person tries to convince another person to steal a med-
ication from a store that belongs to a large retail chain. Is 
this piece of advice (and the very act of stealing) good or 
bad? Why? (2) a group of vigilantes captures a teenager 
who stole something and chains this youngster to a lamp-
post, naked. Is this good or bad? Why? (3) We find sev-
eral perspectives on the practice of abortion in our society. 
Should it be allowed? Only under certain circumstances? 
Why? 
These are the types of questions prescriptive ethics 
is concerned with: why should (or shouldn’t) we do this or 
that? Supposedly, there are no empirical answers to this 
type of question.2 Despite this (or even because this), hu-
man cultures have evolved up to the point of employing 
a great deal of their time and resources exactly to answer 
questions such as these – if not because of another reason, 
because they are inescapable. The alternative would be ir-
rationality, a return to mere animality. Amoebas live their 
lives with no need whatsoever for concerning with prob-
lems of this nature. As it happens to us, everything they 
do produces consequences that are extended throughout 
time, to them and to “the others”, but this does not seem to 
create any ethical problems to them, any need to legislate 
or judge, to classify things and events as either “good” or 
“bad”. What makes us different from them?
This is a kind of response that is common to psy-
chology and to human sciences: unlike amoebas, we have 
consciousness. This is not a satisfactory answer, inasmuch 
as one does not specify what it is to “have consciousness”. 
Behavioral analysts, when called to explain the “mean-
ing” of terms regarding supposed mental phenomena, 
2 Please refer to footnote 1.
usually identify the circumstances that control the emis-
sion of such terms (Skinner, 1945/1972b). By doing this, 
they produce plausible, non-essentialist, and useful3 ex-
planations for these terms, by identifying behavioral pro-
cesses as their “referents”. The possible “meanings” of 
these terms correspond to the situations that may control 
their emission. 
“Conscious behavior” may be interpreted in several 
ways, but the definition most frequently mentioned by be-
havioral analysts points towards the importance of verbal 
communities in “being aware” – of oneself, the others, and 
the world4 (for an excellent explanation of the subject, please 
refer to Zilio, 2011). Within behavioral analysis, it is possible 
to propose the existence of non-verbal forms of conscious-
ness (as done by Zilio, 2011), but the importance of verbal 
behavior to understand behavioral relationships which are 
generally called “conscious” is evident. Being (verbally) 
conscious is to be capable of verbally describing oneself.
As pointed out in the model of selection by conse-
quences proposed by Skinner (1981/2007), verbal behavior 
considerably extends the horizons of our experience, put-
ting our behavior as a whole under the control of variables 
that could not otherwise act – or, simply put, “making us 
aware” of these variables.
Prescriptive ethics in radical behaviorism
From a radical behaviorist perspective, prescrip-
tive ethics deals with two basic axes or dimensions: (1) the 
effects of what we do to ourselves and to others; (2) the 
effects of what we do as considered throughout time. In 
any circumstance we individually or collectively ask “what 
should I (we) do?”, the answer should refer to the effects of 
this action on ourselves (now and in the future) and on oth-
ers (now and in the future). 
As a general rule, we consider the people who “are 
conscious” that their behavior (1) has effects not only to 
themselves, but also to other people; (2) has effects that 
are not only immediate, but also extended throughout time 
ethically better, or more ethically polite. Mere “conscious-
ness”, however, does not ensure the occurrence of behav-
iors we could call ethical – because, as behavioral analysts 
know, there are relevant functional differences between 
saying and doing (Beckert, 2005). Popularly, this is trans-
lated into expressions such as “You are what you do, not 
what you say you’ll do”, “they did not mean it”, “talk is 
cheap”, etc5. However, any expansion of the ethical hori-
zons of humanity in the two dimensions recently pointed 
out necessarily takes place due to increasingly complex 
verbal controls. Without them, it would be impossible for 
mankind to take advantage of the long-term effects of its 
practices in order to re-plan these same practices. 
3 On the usefulness of these interpretations, please refer to Strapasson, 
Carrara, and Lopes Júnior (2007).
4 For an excelente explanation about this subject, refer to Zilio, 2011
5 For behavior analysts, speaking is also doing but this doesn’t dissolve the 
sense of these expressions
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Education is a fundamental part of any cultural 
planning process. To ethically educate a child greatly con-
sists of verbally pointing out the immediate and delayed ef-
fects from what this child does, to itself and to others. The 
child prefers sweets to fruit, but this may cause him health 
problems. He/she wants to play with a toy alone, thus pre-
venting other kids from also playing with it. They do what 
they want “without thinking”, but hurt their parents, put 
their physical integrity at risk, put other children in dan-
ger, etc. Parents know perfectly how many times situations 
like these are repeated. Ethical education is a demanding 
process – which continues, of course, even in the absence 
of the parents. In fact, it is a process we are all submitted 
to for all our lives. What we do in our adult lives keeps 
having effects not only to ourselves, but also to others, now 
and in the future. Verbal control by organized agencies, 
besides the family, resumes our process of expanding our 
ethical horizons. The school, the government, religion, sci-
ence, the media, and several other groups, organized or 
otherwise, point towards others and to the future, in differ-
ent ways and with different purposes. 
Although ethical education is not a recent practice 
along these lines, current science and technology give an 
unprecedented visibility to the connections between what 
we do and the effects of this to us and to the others, now 
and in the future. We are fully prepared, in phylogenetic 
terms, to be affected by the immediate effects of what we 
do, especially to ourselves. The more the effects of what we 
do are extended in time, and the more they affect people 
who are not close to us, the higher is the likelihood of us 
ignoring them – that is, the higher the likelihood that they 
do not affect our behavior. 
Verbal behavior and expansion of ethical 
horizons
Until a few centuries ago, a person could generically 
refer to “mankind”, but what they knew about mankind was 
limited by their geographical mobility or by how little this 
person heard or read (when they could read) about other 
peoples. No one, of course, can fully know “mankind”. In 
this sense, this concept will always be abstract – however, 
an average person nowadays can “be conscious” of man-
kind in ways that would be impossible a few centuries ago. 
This was only possible due to the several scien-
tific and technological innovations that were produced 
throughout history: books, the press, radio and televi-
sion broadcasting, computers, the Internet, etc. Creations 
such as these caused the verbal control on our behavior to 
grow even further, overcome geographical barriers that 
were insurmountable before, and to increase the horizons 
of our speaking and writing, or our listening and read-
ing.6 The overthrowing of a president, a natural disaster, 
6 Simultaneously to the scientific and technological advancements, it is 
possible to point out the increased literacy and the advancement of poli-
tical democratic regimes as relevant aspects in the potentialization of the 
effects of verbal control on our behavior. Although there are still many 
a relevant trial, the death of a celebrity: we immediately 
know about them, we follow them up live, we retransmit 
them, and give our opinions. We hear and read, speak 
and write about these and countless other subjects; we 
influence others and are influenced via verbal behavior. 
In a nutshell, we live in the so-called “Information Age” 
(e. g., Alberts & Papp, 1997), and information is verbal 
behavior.
Part of the information we have access to through 
such advancements has scientific origins. The quality de-
grees of scientific information given by the media are very 
variable, and this deserves the attention of the scientific 
community itself7 (please refer to, for example, Goldacre, 
2013). Leaving this discussion aside, there is no doubt about 
the fact that the media has a considerable power of trans-
forming behaviors through verbal practices – and the media 
may do this while responding to the most varied interests. 
The media occasionally seeks to transform be-
haviors by “bringing the future to the present” – that is, 
making evident what would otherwise never be: the rela-
tionships between what we do now and the effects from 
that to the others and to the future. Science has an especial-
ly relevant role when it points out the evidence from such 
relationships, but the bridge between the academic world 
and the general public is built, as a general rule, by science 
communication. If, as pointed out by Skinner (1977/1978b), 
“people act to improve cultural practices when their social 
environments induce them to do so” (p. 14), science com-
munication is undoubtedly an important part of this induc-
tion process8.
Bringing the future into the present: 
Ecology
The scientific production in the ecology field, espe-
cially in regards to the human influence on global warm-
ing, illustrates such facts. Human beings would never 
“spontaneously” establish any causal relationship between 
their production and consumption practices and global 
warming. Science is a special cultural practice exactly be-
cause it shows causal relationships which are not evident. 
challenges, the world literacy rates have significantly improved over the 
last few decades (UNESCO, 2012). In ancient Greece and Rome, lite-
racy was extremely rare, and it was restricted to political and religious 
elites (Harris, 1991). Literacy is crucially important for the development 
of several relevant aspects of human behavior (UNESCO, 2003), and 
behavior analysis, it is worth pointing out, has given important con-
tributions to this field (e. g., Mauad, Guedes, & Azzi, 2004; De Rose, 
2005). Democracy, in turn, implies the free circulation of information 
and opinions, their confrontation, the freedom to evaluate them, discuss 
them, etc. In practice, several variables make the process less free and 
transparent than one would desire, but the contrast to what happens in 
totalitarian regimes is obvious. 
7 Please refer to, for example, Goldacre (2013).
8 It is worth noting, however, that this is not sufficient to “improve cultural 
practices”. Skinner (1971b, 1977/1978b) insisted on the fact that it is 
not enough to show the delayed effects of what we do: it is necessary to 
create present contingencies that induce possibly beneficial behaviors to 
the future of cultures. However, the media may also influence the very 
process of “creating present contingencies”. 
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It clarifies complex relationships between variables, and by 
doing that it connects facts that could otherwise seem in-
dependent. The data ecological science produces nowadays 
give an unprecedented dimension to our community, our 
shared responsibility: a conclusion is increasingly implied 
that everything we do individually affects all other human 
beings throughout time. 
But is it actually “everything”? Wouldn’t this state-
ment be merely rhetoric, a hyperbole? 
Living implies consuming resources, and this 
is not dependent on the economic system in force. 
“Consuming” literally means wearing down, destroying, 
or eliminating something we get in contact with – as an 
amoeba does with plankton. In this sense, we have al-
ways lived, since the dawn of life and mankind, in “con-
sumer societies”. We consume resources (either natural 
or manufactured) when we eat, when we clean ourselves, 
when we move, when we have fun, when we relax, when 
we sleep – however, this has not always been obvious to 
the human beings, and awareness has been raised on this 
fact especially over the last few decades, especially due 
to the verbal behavior of scientists and science communi-
cation professionals. 
Ecological science reminds us continuously that, as 
living beings, we are consumers, and that this has conse-
quences that are extended throughout time for us and for all 
other consumers (either human or otherwise). By doing so, 
ecological science ends up making us responsible for the 
others and for the future even in intimate moments, which 
up until then were not taken into account – exactly because 
it shows the fact that we never quit being consumers, as 
long as we are alive. In an age that celebrates individuality 
and autonomy, ecology dissolves the boundaries between 
public and private ethics, and reminds us that we are all 
responsible for the future of what is public.
Despite that, it is important to remember that mere-
ly presenting such facts only produces relevant effects on 
the behavior of people whose selective stories have made 
them prone to it. Describing the connections between our 
behavior and its long-term effects is an important vari-
able, which is nonetheless insufficient to produce relevant 
behavioral changes in our cultures. Characteristics from 
different cases must be evaluated in order to account for 
changes in behavioral probabilities. Consequences that af-
fect us directly (whether they are natural or planned) pro-
duce behavioral effects that are more solid than the ones 
produced by mere descriptions – but even ecological emer-
gencies may only produce such effects momentarily, as il-
lustrated by Diamond (2005):
When the city of Tucson in Arizona went through 
a severe drought in the 1950s, its alarmed citizens 
swore that they would manage their water better, 
but soon returned to their water-guzzling ways of 
building golf courses and watering their gardens. 
(p. 505)
It is obviously preferable – and presently re-
quired – that ecologically relevant behavioral changes 
take place in preventive ways rather than only during 
localized crises. Thus, cultural planning initiatives must 
include the use of immediate, contingent consequences 
to behaviors that favor sustainability. As pointed out by 
Skinner (1971a), “we shall work for the survival of our 
culture, if at all, because of the personal goods which 
are effective because of our genetic endowment, as 
these arise naturally or as part of our cultural environ-
ment” (p. 551).
Bringing the future into the present: 
Economics
The connections between ecology and economics 
are evident, as economics studies production and consump-
tion patterns, and these patterns are the ones that generate 
the long-term ecological effects we are aware of nowadays. 
At a time in which the economic relationships (the produc-
tion and exchange of reinforcers) reach an unprecedented 
complexity, organized groups seek to lead people to use 
their countercontrol power politically as consumers and 
citizens9. We are advised to avoid products that are harmful 
to the environment (whether as a result from their manu-
facturing process or the residues of their use) and to choose 
“eco-friendly” products. We are informed about companies 
that use child or slave labor or about companies that expose 
their workers to degrading and unhealthy working condi-
tions. We are reminded all time that decisions that seemed 
simple and “individual” before are filled with ethical im-
plications. Buying this or that laundry detergent, shoe, or 
car also becomes a moral issue, because in capitalist econo-
mies, the destination consumers give to their financial re-
sources greatly determines which production practices will 
be either supported or not. Beyond the consuming behav-
ior, however, traditional ways of political participation by 
common citizens are also guided by such organized groups 
– from demands for change in environmental legislations 
to voting for candidates who are committed to the sustain-
ability agenda.
The strategies from such groups are not exempted 
from criticism. Getting people to expand their ethical ho-
rizons, “to be aware” of the effects they cause on oth-
ers and on the future, may be important – but will it be 
enough? To which extent does this change, for example, 
9  A good example is England-based Ethical Consumer, which presents 
as its main goal “making global businesses more sustainable through 
consumer pressure”. Upon stating it mission, the organization makes it 
clear that it deals with consumption as a path for ethical and political ac-
tion: “In a world where people feel politically disempowered, and where 
governments are becoming less powerful than corporations, citizens are 
beginning to realise that their economic vote may have as much influen-
ce as their political vote”. Nevertheless, despite stimulating consumers 
to “assert your own ethical values through the market”, the organization 
stresses that “Ethical consumerism is not a replacement for other forms 
of political action”, even though it is “an important additional way for 
people to exert their influence”. Available from http://www.ethicalcon-
sumer.org/aboutus/ourmission.aspx
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the behavior of consuming? Consuming is a wide and 
multi-determined class of behaviors10, and even though 
we sympathize with the poor working conditions to which 
Chinese workers who manufac- ture tablets are exposed, 
this may not be enough to change our decisions as con-
sumers. We are not required to seek information on the 
manufacture processes of what we buy, and it would be 
even impossible to do that in regards to everything we 
consume. None will criticize us directly for buying this or 
that product, even if it is harmful, as it is our right as con-
sumers. We may even do that without leaving our homes 
– and, after all, we have not asked for things to be as they 
are: we are not personally responsible for the problems 
in the productive system, and we do authorize or agree 
to any kind of injustice – and, besides this, we need the 
product, we want the product, and it is the product that is 
before our eyes, with its bold design, its shining package, 
and its qualities varnished by marketing – not the history 
of its production or the sub-products of its consumption. 
This is a good example of what Marxists want to show 
when they mention the “contradictions of capitalism”. 
Companies are not charities. They do what the current 
contingencies in capitalist economies recommend them to 
do: maximize the financial returns to their shareholders, 
within (and occasionally outside) the legal frameworks 
that regulate their activities (Diamond, 2005, p. 577). 
The strategy of showing consumers the pro-
cesses involved in the production and consumption of 
certain products is based on the very “market laws”: if 
a significant group of consumers stops buying a certain 
product and also gives negative feedback about it (which 
may be potentialized nowadays by online communica-
tion), the company that manufactures it could address 
the problem only for maintaining its clients – and its 
revenue, as a consequence11.The success of this strategy 
varies from case to case, but the “economic vote” seems 
a clear countercontrol practice by organized citizens 
in regards to cultural practices whose harmful effects 
would be clear.
10 Please refer to, for example, Foxall, Oliveira-Castro, James, Yani-de-So-
riano, and Sigurdsson (2006).
11 Among the countless examples in which this strategy worked or has 
worked, the one of American sporting goods company Nike is especially 
emblematic (Birch, 2012). The analysis of topics like this may be exten-
ded – as it frequently is – to the discussion of political and economic mo-
dels. Wouldn’t strategies such as this one only be masking the true pro-
blem – that is, the very existence of the capitalist model? The attempts at 
fully nationalizing the economic activity seemingly had negative results 
in several countries, and they were accompanied by political regimes that 
were not really partial to democracy. This, of course, does not prevent 
that new versions of socialism be defended. People who adopt this postu-
re may even state that anything that is done in order to improve the lives 
and happiness of people in capitalist societies will end up deepening and 
disguising the injustices in capitalism – and, as we observed elsewhe-
re, “a Marxist can always state capitalism is near its end; to that end, it 
suffices that capitalism exists” (Dittrich, 2010, p. 49). For such people, 
only the radical reformulation of the political and economic grounds of 
national economies – maybe all of them – is likely to be accepted as a 
long-term solution.
Control, countercontrol, and the “fourth 
estate”
In market economies that are regulated and in-
spected by state agencies, we naturally focus on companies 
and governments when we are, for any reason, interested 
in the economy and its collective effects throughout time. 
Skinner (also mentioning religion) seemed to be very pes-
simistic in regard to such agencies: 
Governments, religions, and capitalistic systems, 
whether public or private, control most of the re-
inforcers of daily life; they must use them, as they 
have always done, for their own aggrandizement, 
and they have nothing to gain by relinquishing 
power. (1987b, p. 7)
The holders of economic power, the ones who have 
money, will continue using it to produce quick prof-
its, with no concern whatsoever to global problems 
. . . . As for politicians, they are always worried 
about their next election, and therefore, unwilling 
to support sacrifices today in order to preserve the 
future. (1983, p. 4)
Considering this perspective, Skinner pointed out 
the importance of countercontrol agents he collectively 
called the “fourth estate” (as opposed to the three classic 
“estates”: government, economy, and religion (1983, p. 4; 
1989, p. 120). Skinner mentions scientists, intellectuals, 
professors, and journalists as components of this “fourth 
estate”, also assigning them as “the uncommitted” (1987b, 
p.8). It should be noted that nowadays new and important 
social players join the fourth estate, in Brazil and other 
countries. The presence and influence of non-governmen-
tal organizations is increasingly clear, and the counter-
control in regards to traditional press agencies has grown 
considerably, through the rise of alternative journalism and 
opinion groups. Several of these groups and organizations 
ariseas a result of civil society dissatisfaction, which rep-
resents a healthy signal of advancement in the dynamics of 
control and countercontrol in democratic societies. 
According to Skinner, “the uncommitted” “have lit-
tle or no power and hence little or nothing to gain from the 
present” (1973/1978a, p. 28). They share a detachment in 
regards to the present and are, therefore, “free to consider a 
more remote future” (1987b, p. 08), but “only to the extent 
that it is not controlled by the current interests of a gov-
ernment, religion, or economic system” (1973/1978a, p. 28) 
Politicians, businesspeople, and religious groups may also 
take part in this group, but “only to the extent that they are 
uncommitted to their respective institutions” (1987b, p. 08) 
Obviously, the double strain between immediate and long-
term consequences, and between individual and collective 
consequences, constitutes the context for Skinner’s analy-
sis on “the uncommitted”. It is with these consequences 
that different persons and groups are either committed or 
Psicologia USP   I   www.scielo.br/pusp456
Alexandre Dittrich
456
uncommitted to – that is, it is under their direct or indirect 
control that people or groups act. 
Just as we may be skeptical about companies and 
governments, we may and must be skeptical in regards 
to the degree to which a person or group that supposedly 
belongs to the “fourth estate” is “uncommitted”. Skinner 
himself pointed out that this skepticism is almost inevi-
table, given a continuous history of power being used, in 
all its forms, to satisfy personal and short-term interests: 
A disinterested consideration of cultural practices 
from which suggestions for improvement may 
emerge is still often regarded as impossible. This 
is the price we pay for the fact that men (1) have so 
often improved their control of other men for pur-
poses of exploitation, (2) have had to bolster their 
social practices with spurious justifications and (3) 
have so seldom shared the attitudes of the basic sci-
entist. (1961/1972a, pp. 48-49)
Despite such skepticism, there is no doubt regard-
ing the importance in the existence and growth of counter-
control instances in democratic societies, in order to avoid 
excessive concentration of power. Stage agents have always 
practiced active and passive corruption, and market agents 
have always sought to produce profits, occasionally in dis-
agreement with the public interest, within or outside estab-
lished legal frameworks. The agencies in the fourth estate 
are not free from their own commitments, and these may 
not always coincide with the long-term collective interest. 
It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the main demand 
to be put forth to governments, companies, and agencies 
in fourth estate is to continuously increase the transpar-
ency degree of their activities. Secret votes, undeclared 
funding and “inspections” with obscure criteria undermine 
and weaken the balance in the relationships of control and 
countercontrol between citizens and public and private in-
stitutions. The maintenance of this balance, by avoiding 
excessive concentration of power, may ensure the survival 
of democratic cultures.
Conclusion
Not only has the progress of science and technology 
potentialized the long-term effects of what we do, but also 
our very consciousness about such effects. In the so-called 
Information Age, progressively more complex verbal con-
trols, which have largely been produced by science and 
advertised in the media, have been expanding our ethical 
horizons – and making our ethical decisions equally more 
complex. Such verbal controls show the connections be-
tween what we do individually or in group and the effects 
of this to us and to other people throughout time. 
Since Skinner’s initial analyses (1953/1965) on so-
cial and cultural phenomena, behavior analysis has insisted 
on the importance of considering such effects in cultural 
design. Obviously, behavior analysis is not doing this alone, 
and the existence of cultural practices that point towards 
the importance of planning the cultures themselves is not 
casual. The evolution of cultures, which is built based on 
the phylogenetic and ontogenetic heritage of their members, 
resumes selective processes that produce a “progressive 
sensitivity from organisms and people to the consequences 
of their actions” (Abib, 2001, p. 111) and an “education for 
self-control” (p. 116) which reflects such sensitivity.
Cultures that teach their citizens to identify the 
long-term consequences of their practices presumably have 
more chances of surviving and creating relatively balanced 
systems of power distribution through control and counter-
control practices. Agencies in the so-called “fourth estate” 
have an important role in the maintenance of this balance, 
especially when they push companies and governments 
into being transparent in their activities – however, this re-
quirement for transparency must be extended to the agen-
cies in the “fourth estate” themselves. As much as possible, 
we must make the commitments of all players who are part 
of the set of forces in contemporary societies clear, in order 
to produce some balance between private and public, im-
mediate and long-term interests. Clarifying the “motiva-
tions” that control the behavior of such players requires the 
analysis of the behavioral contingencies they are part of.
Ecologia e economia: problemas éticos contemporâneos a partir de um ponto de vista behaviorista radical
Resumo: Para o behaviorismo radical, a ética prescritiva lida com dois eixos ou dimensões básicas: (1) os efeitos do que fazemos 
sobre nós mesmos e sobre os outros; e (2) os efeitos do que fazemos considerados ao longo do tempo. O presente artigo 
visa apontar como controles verbais progressivamente mais complexos afetam nosso comportamento em relação a esses dois 
eixos, tomando a ecologia e a economia como exemplos contemporâneos. Conclui-se que tais controles verbais tornam nossas 
próprias escolhas éticas mais complexas. Culturas que ensinam seus cidadãos a identificar as consequências de longo prazo de 
suas práticas presumivelmente têm mais chances de sobreviver e de criar sistemas relativamente equilibrados de distribuição 
de poder.
Palavras-chave: behaviorismo radical, ética, ecologia, economia.
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Ecologie et economie: problèmes contemporaines d’éthique sous un point de vue behavioriste radical
Résumé: Pour le behaviorisme radical, l’éthique prescriptive a deux axes ou dimensions fondamentaux: (1) les effets de ce 
qu’on fait à soi-même ou aux autres; et (2) les effets de ce qu’on a fait au fil du temps. Cet article se propose d’exposer – avec 
des exemples actuels de l’écologie et de l’économie – de quelle façon les contrôles verbaux progressivement plus complexes 
affectent notre comportement en face de ces deux axes. On en conclut que ces contrôles verbaux produisent des choix éthiques 
plus complexes. Des cultures qui enseignent leurs citoyens que les pratiques culturelles ont des conséquences à long terme 
peuvent survivre plus longtemps, ainsi que créer systèmes de pouvoir relativement équilibrées.
Mots-clés: behaviorisme radical, éthique, ecologie, economie.
Ecología y economía: problemas éticos contemporáneos desde un punto de vista conductista radical
Resumen: Para el conductismo radical, la ética prescriptiva lidia con dos ejes o dimensiones básicas: (1) los efectos de nuestra 
acción sobre nosotros y sobre otras personas; y (2) los efectos de nuestra acción con el paso del tiempo. Este artículo visa señalar 
como controles verbales progresivamente más complejos afectan nuestra conducta en relación a estos dos ejes, tomando la 
ecología y la economía como ejemplos contemporáneos. Concluimos que estos controles verbales tornan nuestras propias 
elecciones éticas más complejas. Culturas que enseñan sus ciudadanos a reconocer las consecuencias de largo plazo de sus 
prácticas presumiblemente tienen más chances de sobrevivir y crear sistemas relativamente equilibrados de distribución de 
poder.
Palabras clave: conductismo radical, ética, ecología, economía.
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